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Abstract
Control of open source projects is problematic because of the very nature and ideology of the open source
paradigm. In contrast to commercial software projects, there are no formal control mechanisms in place and
participation is generally voluntary in open source projects. However, despite this apparent lack of control of
the project, open source software development has become a viable and cost effective way of developing high
quality software. This paper reports on a quantitative study which tested the impact of informal control on the
effectiveness of the core group of software developers in open source projects. The findings indicate that clan
control and self control impact positively on the various dimensions of the group effectiveness of the core group
of software developers in open source projects.
Keywords: open source projects; informal control; clan control; self control; group effectiveness; project output;,
group cohesion; benefits to group members.

INTRODUCTION
Open source software has gained much attention in recent years due to the success of a number of large scale
software projects, such as Linux and Apache. There is no doubt that there are an increasing number of good
quality open source software packages available for a wide range of business applications. However, despite the
obvious success of open source software as an alternative development approach, the dynamics of the open
source software development approach are still not well understood. How can a group of software developers
geographically dispersed across the globe deliver high quality software in relatively short time frames when
there are no formal control mechanisms in place to manage an open source project? In this research project we
were interested in finding out how informal control can lead to effective group behaviours and outcomes from
the core groups of software developers in open source projects.
This paper is structured as follows. First, open source software as a development approach is discussed, and it is
argued from the existing literature that it is a viable alternative way to develop cost effective software. Then
control theory and open source projects are discussed in terms of how informal control over an open source
project is achieved. Next, effectiveness of the core group of software developers in open source projects is
discussed in terms of Hackman’s (1990) group theory. The research hypotheses are outlined and the method used
to collect empirical data and test these research hypotheses is described and justified. The results of the data
analysis are presented and discussed in relation to the research hypotheses. Finally, conclusions and implications
of this study for research and practice are discussed and suggestions are made for future work.
Open source software as a viable and alternative development approach
The open source software movement has caught the attention of the software industry and IT industry in general
because of its ability to produce high quality software at low cost, and in short time frames, using virtual groups
of software developers geographically dispersed (Good 2002; Perens 2004; Wheeler 2005). The global
infrastructure of the Internet enables software developers to work together efficiently and effectively in a
networked and collaborative manner to develop software. The open source approach creates a dynamic synergy
allowing virtual teams of software developers who have never met face-to-face to form communities based on
self-interest to develop new software and to improve on existing software products (President’s Information
Technology Advisory Committee 2000).
The open source movement is a major paradigm shift in the way that software applications will be developed in
the future (O'Reilly 2004; Perens 2004). The open source movement is driven by three significant trends in the
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software industry: commoditisation of software; collaborative development enabled through Internet
infrastructure; and software customisability and delivery of software as web services over the Internet (O'Reilly
2004; Perens 2004). The culmination of these three trends will see software and ICT become increasingly a
utility which can be developed, refined and delivered using the Internet infrastructure (Carr 2003; Flashline Inc
2004; O'Reilly 2004; Perens 2004). Table 1 shows, through a comparison of open source against conventional
software development approaches, that there are significant advantages to be gained from the open source
development approach.
Table 1 Comparison of the open source development approach with conventional software development
approaches (Source adopted from Perens 2004)
Paradigm

Efficiency

Failure
Rate

Distributes
Cost

Distributes
Risk

Retail

less than
10%

50%

In-House and
Contract
Consortium
and NonOpen-Source
Collaboration
Open Source

60% to
80%
60% to
80%

50%

Late,
sometime
after sales
start.
No

60% to
100%

Perhaps
90%,
unacceptably
high.
50%

No.

Protects
Customer
Differentiation
No.

Protects
Vendor
Differentiation
Yes.

Required
Market
Size
100,000
and up.

No.

Yes.

Maybe

1

Yes

Yes

Maybe

Maybe

5 and up.

Early, during
development

Yes

No

No

5 and up.

Open source software development is gaining acceptance and respectability as a viable way to develop high
quality and innovative software (Good 2002; Perens 2004; Wheeler 2005; Open Source Initiative 2005). The
global market place is now demanding open standards as the Internet continues to evolve into the global
operating system on which all business applications will need to run in the future. Software development can be
classified into non-differentiating software such as retail/packaged software and open source to which everyone
has access and differentiating software which is developed in-house or by contract and gives an organisation a
competitive advantage in the market place. Only 10 percent of software needs of an organisation are in
differentiating software (Perens 2004). Hence, open source software is a viable, cost effective alternative for the
rest of an organisation’s software needs (Good 2002; Perens 2004; Wheeler 2005).
However, the dynamics of open source software development as a process are not well understood. The existing
literature suggests that open source software is developed out of a combination of extrinsic and intrinsic
motivations by software developers (Osterloh, Frost & Frey 2002) and that informal control plays a key part in
governing the effective participation of open source developers (Gallivan 2001; Stewart & Gosain 2002;
Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003; Basnet 2004; Lattemann & Stieglitz 2005). These are quite powerful controls
because building and maintaining a reputation is a prime motivation for participating in an open source project.
Although the process of open source software development is much less structured than traditional approaches, it
still follows a rigorous path. There are a number of checks and controls, such as version and configuration
management and mechanisms, which ensure that only high quality code is released (Cubranic & Booth 1999;
Healy & Schussman 2003).
Control theory and open source projects
The dynamics of controlling participation in open source projects is not well understood and there is little
empirical research beyond a meta-analysis of existing literature on control of open source projects (Gallivan
2001; Basnet 2004). Control can be viewed in a behavioural sense (Kirsch 1996, 1997), based on standards
expected from past experience (behavioural control). Control can be viewed through an assessment of outputbased predetermined goals (output control). Control can also be viewed as social governance based on
conformity to certain moral and cultural rules (social control) (Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003; Lattemann &
Stieglitz 2005). This form of control provides a much better fit with the structure and processes of open source
projects (Sharma, Sugumaran & Rajagopalan 2002) In the context of open source projects, informal control can
be viewed as endeavouring to ensure individuals act in a manner that is consistent with achieving the desired
objectives of an open source project and in line with the ideology of the open source movement. The existing
literature suggests that informal controls are more likely to be dominant forms of control in open source projects.
Informal controls can be classified into two types: clan control and self-control. Clan control is implemented
through mechanisms that minimize the differences between controller’s and controllee’s preferences (Eisenhardt
1985) by ‘promulgating common values, beliefs, and philosophy within a clan in other words a common set of
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beliefs and ideology, which is defined as a group of individuals who are dependent on one another and who
share a set of common goals’ (Kirsch 1996, p. 217), or by identifying and reinforcing acceptable behaviours
through shared experiences, rituals, and ceremonies (Kirsch 1996, Ouchi 1980). However, clan control may be
difficult to achieve in open source projects unless they are part of a long term alliance, such as is the case with
the core software developers (Das & Teng 1998, 2001; Carmel 1999). Like clan control, self-control relies on the
controllee engaging in behaviour consistent with the best interests of the controller without formal controls.
However, there is an important distinction: unlike clan control, in which control stems from sharing norms and
values (open source ideology) within a group, self-control is a function of individual objectives and standards
and intrinsic motivation (Kirsch 1996, p. 218).
With self-control, the controllee determines both the goals and the actions through which they should be
achieved (Henderson & Lee 1992), as in self regulated teams (Cummings 1978, Manz & Sims 1980).
Mechanisms supporting self-control are primarily implemented by the controllee. Such mechanisms may include
the controllee identifying and establishing standards for their own behaviour, or establishing a timetable for
project milestones and monitoring progress against these milestones. However, as several authors (e.g. Von
Glinow 1983, Kirsch 1996) have noted, the controller can also encourage or enable the controllee to exercise
self-control. ‘Controllers, who do not directly exercise self-control over others, nevertheless can encourage
others to exercise self control. For example, controllers can train and mentor controllees in appropriate
techniques (Brief & Aldag 1981) or ensure that tasks are clearly defined for discernable boundaries for an open
source project (Cummings 1978; Kirsch 1996). Controllers can also institute performance evaluation schemes
that reward autonomy and self management’ (Kirsch et al. 2002, p. 486). In self-control, the individual,
independent of formal organizational mechanisms or group norms, institutes the rewards (Kirsch 1996). Finally,
in clan control rewards and sanctions depend on whether the individuals act according to group values, norms,
and objectives (Kirsch et al. 2002). However, rewards may be implicit in clan control, with no need for
formalised rewards mechanisms. According to Kirsch et al. (2002), in clan control, ‘Unlike behaviour and
outcome control situations, there is no need for explicit incentives to align the goals of controllers and
controllees because of the existence of shared goals’ (p. 486).
Group effectiveness of open source projects
Groups in an open source project context are defined as an assortment of individuals where each individual
contribution to the project is summated and produces a successful comprehensive project as the result of group
effort (Furst, Blackburn & Rosen 1999). Performance evaluation and accountability for a group will occur at the
individual, rather than the collective, level. Then, group members are collections of individuals who interact
extensively to produce a deliverable, who are then evaluated based on the team outcome, and are accountable as
a team for team outcomes (Sundstrom et al. 1990). While there may be many members of an open source
project, the software development group is really confined to the core group of software developers who make
and monitor work contributed to the project.
The effectiveness of free/open source projects was viewed through the theoretical lens of Hackman’s (1990)
group effectiveness theory which consists of three dimensions: group output, group cohesion and psychological
benefits to group members. Hackman’s (1990) model of group effectiveness is a comprehensive model depicting
three variables associated with group effectiveness. This model proposes that group effectiveness is a
multidimensional construct consisting of three dependent variables or factors: (1) The degree to which the
group's products or services meet the standards of quantity, quality and timeliness of those who receive, review
and/or use the output—project output; (2) The degree to which the group's work processes enhance the capability
of members to work together interdependently in the future—group cohesion; and (3) the degree to which the
group's experience contributes to the growth and personal well being of team members—benefit to members
(Hackman et al. 1986)
Project output is an important dependent factor or variable of group effectiveness of open source projects.
Productive output can be achieved by ensuring that the group's products or services meet the standards of
quantity, quality and timeliness of those who receive, review and/or use the output (Hackman 1987). Evaluating
whether a project team has been effective in reaching shared goals; whether the quality of the software created
from this project is high; and whether the project tasks are completed on time are some examples of project
output factors which measure the group effectiveness of the open source projects.
In obtaining the maximum outcome of the projects, the group cohesion factor effectively plays an important role
through an extensive interaction among group members and reflects the diversity of ideas generated by the group
(Nemeth 1992), member involvement (Lawler 1986), and increased group efficiency and productivity (Hammer
& Champy 1993). Prior literature discusses group members’ urge for cohesive behaviour in a developer
community, including establishing a group identity that encourages group members to put group goals before
individual goals (Gaertner et al. 1989), building trust among group members (Mayer, Davis & Schoorman 1995)
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and generating co-operation among heterogeneous group members (Nemeth 1993; Tusi, Egan & O’Reilly 1992;
Watson, Kuman & Michaelson 1993).
In an environment like open source projects, the life span of each project is limited. Hence, the group members
look for benefits, including expanding their social networks within developer communities, the work methods of
developer community teams can become an important part of the organization's knowledge repository,
acquisition of new skills by contributing himself, professional growth and development, etc. Such benefits would
play an important role and a dependent factor in determining the group effectiveness of open source projects
Therefore, this research paper will report on the impact of informal control on the group effectiveness of open
source projects as part of a larger empirical study. The measures of the three dimensions of group effectiveness
were adapted to the context of the core group of software developers in open source projects by refining a
number of existing scales from previous empirical studies which examined various dimensions of group
effectiveness (Denison 1996; Janz 1999; Carless & De Paola 2000; Lurey & Raisinghani 2001; Stewart &
Gosain 2002, 2002; Pescosolido 2003).
Research hypotheses and method
In this paper we investigate the impact of informal control on the effectiveness of virtual communities in
free/open source projects. In particular, we are concerned with the impact of clan control and self control
dimensions of informal control on the group effectiveness of software developers in open source projects (Basnet
2004). Figure 1 is the theoretical conceptualisation of the proposed research model which we tested empirically
using multiple regression analysis.

Informal control

Group effectiveness of core
software developers in open
source projects

Clan
control

Project
Output

Group
Cohesion
Self
control
Benefits to
Members

Hypotheses tested to confirm the relationships between the two dimensions of the independent variable informal
control and the three dimensions of the dependent variable, group effectiveness in open source projects are:
H1: Clan control positively influences group effectiveness of open source projects:
H1a: Clan control positively influences project output.
H1b: Clan control positively influences the group cohesion.
H1c: Clan control positively influences the benefits to group members.
H2: Self control positively influences group effectiveness of open source projects:
H2a: Self control positively influences project output.
H2b: Self control positively influences the group cohesion.
H2c: Self control positively influences the benefits to group members.
The research method employed to collect and analyse data to test the hypotheses was quantitative. An online
survey was sent by email to 5000 members of Source Forge (www.sourceforge.net). SourceForge.net is the
dominant open source development portal, with over 100,000 registered open source projects currently in
different phases of the project life cycle (http:www.sourceforge.net). The sample was obtained by selecting the

16th Australasian Conference on Information Systems
29 Nov – 2 Dec 2005, Sydney

Informal Control in Open Source Projects
Michael Lane

core software developers from the most active projects in the five categories of the project life cycle. An open
source project is classified in Sourceforge.net into five distinct project life cycle phases: (1) pre alpha; (2) alpha;
(3) beta; (4) production stable; and (5) mature—which are used to categorise open source projects in their stages
of development. The survey instrument was developed by adapting and refining scales from existing empirical
studies which had measured the constructs of interest in this study. The targeted respondents were asked to focus
on a particular current and recent free/open source project when answering the online questionnaire. In all, 785
responses were received, of which there were 635 usable responses. The effective response rate was
approximately 18 percent after the sample size had been adjusted for ineligible and unreachable email addresses.
This was considered a reasonable response rate for an online survey. The number of cases in sample size was
more than adequate to conduct factor analysis and three sets of multiple regression analyses with three
independent variables and three dependent variables.
Discussion of data analysis results
Firstly, the data items measuring informal control and group effectiveness were examined for normality by
examining the graphical distribution of the data sample for each measurement item, the mean, standard
deviation, and the skewness and kurtosis for each measurement item. All of the data items were found to be
representative of a normal distribution as the skew and kurtosis values were within the acceptable range of the
absolute value of 2 (Hair et al. 1998; Coakes 2005).

RESULTS OF FACTOR ANALYSIS AND RELIABILITY ANALYSIS FOR
INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Factor analysis and reliability analysis were conducted together to ensure the measurement items for the two
dimensions of informal control and the three dimensions of group effectives in open source projects were valid
and reliable measures. Table 2 shows that the factor analysis of the two dimensions of informal control resulted
in a three factor model of informal control: clan control, and two distinct dimensions of self control: autonomy
and personal goals.
Table 2 Results of factor analysis and reliability analysis for independent variable—informal control
Independent variables

Factor
loadings

Clan Control
1. I am willing to put in extra effort for this project to be successful
(dropped)
2. My values and that of other members of this project are similar
.674
3. This project and its members inspire my programming effort
.677
4. Members of this project are one big family
.745
5. Free/OSS programmers should help each other out
,549
6. The members of this project have common set of values, beliefs, norms about open source
.728
software
Variance explained 30.93% Cronbach Alpha 0.724
Self Control through Autonomy
2. I have significant freedom over what work I do in this project
.744
3. I have significant freedom over how I do work in this project
.813
4. Meeting my goals in this project gives me a feeling of accomplishment
.817
Variance explained 11.395%
% Cronbach Alpha 0.76
Self control through personal goals
1. I am responsible for setting my own goals for project work
.729
5. Meeting my goals in this project contributes to my professional growth
.857
6. Meeting my goals in this project improves my self-esteem
.788
Variance explained 16.732% Cronbach Alpha 0.74
Total Variance Explained = 59.06 %; Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of Sampling Adequacy = 0.787
Bartlett test of sphericity = 1752.680; Significance = 0.000

Item to
total
correlation

.477
.505
.534
.384
.520

.559
.612
.629

.498
.641
.563

One item, clan control (clan control item 1), cross loaded on two dimensions of informal control and have factor
loadings of 0.31 and 0.37 which are less than the recommended minimum 0.5 (Hair et al. 1998). After reviewing
the wording of the clan control item 1 statement and considering the results of the factor analysis, it was decided
to drop this item. The remaining items measuring the three dimensions of informal control displayed adequate
discriminant and convergent validity as indicated by the factor loadings, which are all above recommended
minimum 0.5. The Cronbach alpha scores from the scale reliability analysis for these three dimensions are all
above the recommended 0.7, indicating that these items are reliable measures of these dimensions (Nunnally
1979; Hair et al. 1998).

16th Australasian Conference on Information Systems
29 Nov – 2 Dec 2005, Sydney

Informal Control in Open Source Projects
Michael Lane

Factor analysis and scale reliability analysis were also conducted for the three dimensions of the group
effectiveness to ensure that the measurement items were valid and reliable. Table 3 shows that the factor analysis
of the items measuring the three dimensions of group effectiveness resulted in a three factor model.
Table 3 Results of factor analysis and reliability analysis for dependent variable group effectiveness in open
source projects
Dependent variables

Factor
loadings

Project Output
1. Project team has been effective in reaching shared goals
.787
2. Feedback indicates that project output is useful
.683
3. Members will continue to meet project goals
.797
4. Software created from this project is high quality
.636
5. Project output is greater than individual contributions
Dropped
6. Knowledge and information have been produced in this project
Dropped
7. Project tasks are completed on time
.605
Variance explained 15.69% Cronbach Alpha 0.78
Group Cohesion
1. I try to help any member with difficulties they are having with project tasks
.787
2. The blame for mistakes made in this project shared amongst members
.788
Group Cohesion continued
3. I look forward to continuing as a member in this project
.496
4. : Based on my experiences on this project, I would be interested in participating in other
Dropped
Open Source Software projects in the future
Variance explained 9.53%
% Cronbach Alpha 0.6
Benefits to group members
1. I developed new skills while working on this project
.859
2. I learned things in this project that I will use in other projects
.810
3. I am highly satisfied with my professional growth and development in this project
.814
4. I get a feeling of worthwhile accomplishment from being involved in this project
.709
Variance explained 34.76% Cronbach Alpha 0.85
Total Variance Explained = 59.99 %; Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of Sampling Adequacy = 0.829
Bartlett test of sphericity = 2528.455; Significance = 0.000

Item to total
correlation
.624
.476
.656
.495

.453

.488
.416
.355

.693
.689
.745
.633

The factor loadings were all above the recommended 0.5, except for measurement item 3 for group cohesion
which was 0.496 and was retained as the factor loading was significant given the large data sample size of 635
valid responses. Two items were dropped from the project output dimension of group effectiveness as the factor
loadings for these items were lower than the recommended 0.5 level (Hair et al. 1998). Additionally, after
reviewing the statements for items 5 and 6 it was felt that these items were somewhat ambiguous and not clear
statements which are representative measures of project output. All remaining items measuring the three
dimensions of group effectiveness displayed adequate discriminant and convergent validity. The Cronbach alpha
score for 5 items retained for project output which was above the recommended 0.7 level indicated these items
were a reliable measure of project output (Nunnally 1979). One item was dropped from the group cohesion
dimension because of the low factor loading. The Cronbach alpha score of 0.6 indicated that the 3 items retained
may not be a reliable measure of group cohesion but, given the exploratory nature of this research, it was decided
to retain group cohesion despite its less than adequate reliability (Hair et al. 1998). All four measurement items
were retained for benefits to group members as the factor loading were above the recommended 0.5 level and
indicated adequate discriminant and convergent validity. The Cronbach alpha score of 0.85 was above the
recommended 0.7 level and indicated that the 4 items were a reliable measure of the benefits to group members.

RESULTS OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR THREE DEPENDENT
VARIABLES
In order to run the three sets of multiple regression models, it was important to ensure that the underlying
assumptions of multiple regression analysis were met by examining the multiple regression models for linearity,
homescedasticity, independence of the residuals and normality. Linearity was assessed by analysing the residuals
and partial regression plots. The multiple regression models were found to be linear after examining the residual
plots and no non linear pattern was found after examining the partial plots for the each of the independent
variables. After examining the residual plots the constancy of the residuals across the independent variables
indicated homescedasticity in independent variables. The independence of the residuals was evaluated using the
Durbin Watson test and for all of the three multiple regression models the range was within 1.5 and 2.5 required
for independent observations. The normality of the error terms was examined using the normality probability
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plots of the residuals. Since all of residual values fell along the diagonal with no substantial or systematic
departure, residuals are considered to represent a normal distribution.
Table 4 Multiple Regression Model 1 Summary
Std. Error of the
R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Estimate
Durbin-Watson
.383(a)
.147
.91472114
.143
1.915
a Predictors: (Constant), Autonomy, Personal Goals, Clan Control b Dependent Variable: Project Output
Table 5 ANOVA(b) for Multiple Regression Model 1
Sum of Squares
Df
Mean Square
F
Sig.
91.033
3
30.344
.000(a)
36.266
527.967
631
.837
619.000
634
a Predictors: (Constant), Autonomy, Personal Goals, Clan Control b Dependent Variable: Project Output
Regression
Residual
Total

Table 6 Coefficients(a) for Multiple Regression Model 1
Unstandardized
Standardized
Coefficients
Coefficients

(Constant)
Clan Control
Personal Goals
Autonomy

B
-1.277E-16

.379
.006
.052
a Dependent Variable: Project Output

Std. Error
.036

Beta

.037
.037
.037

.380
.006
.052

T value

Sig.

.000

1.000

10.331
.166
1.427

.000
.868
.154

Collinearity Statistics
Tolerance

VIF

1.000
1.000
1.000

1.000
1.000
1.000

Tables 4, 5 and 6 show the results of the multiple regression analysis for the dependent variable project output.
Overall three independent variables explain 14.3 percent of the variance in the dependent variable project output,
which is highly significant given the F value of 36.266 in the Anvoa table. The tolerance and variance inflation
factor values are low and indicate that multicollinearity is not a problem in this multiple regression model. Clan
control is the only significant positive indicator of open source group effectiveness in terms of project output
with a beta coefficient of 0.38and a T value of 10.331 which is statistically significant at 0.01 level. The other
informal control factors, personal goals and autonomy, are not significant indicators of open source group
effectiveness in terms of project output
Table 7 Multiple Regression Model 2 Summary
Adjusted R
Std. Error of
R
R Square
Durbin-Watson
Square
the Estimate
.345(a)
.119
.115
.92969970
1.864
a Predictors: (Constant), Autonomy, Personal Goals, Clan Control b Dependent Variable: Group Cohesion

Table 8 ANOVA(b) for Multiple Regression Model 2
Sum of
Df
Mean Square
F
Sig.
Squares
Regression 73.600
3
24.533
28.384
.000(a)
Residual
545.400
631
.864
Total
619.000
634
a Predictors: (Constant), Autonomy, Personal Goals, Clan Control b Dependent Variable: Group Cohesion
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Table 9 Coefficients(a) for Multiple Regression Model 2
Unstandardized
Coefficients
B
-5.357E-17
.320
.101
.076
b Dependent Variable: Group Cohesion
(Constant)
Clan Control
Personal Goals
Autonomy

Std. Error
.037
.037
.037
.037

Standardized
Coefficients

T Value

Sig.

.000
8.588
2.699
2.027

1.000
.000
.007
.043

Beta
.321
.101
.076

Collinearity Statistics
Tolerance

VIF

1.000
1.000
1.000

1.000
1.000
1.000

Tables 7, 8 and 9 show the results of the multiple regression analysis for the dependent variable group cohesion.
Overall three independent variables explain 11.5 percent of the variance in the dependent variable group
cohesion which is highly significant given the F value of 28.384 in the Anvoa table. The tolerance and variance
inflation factor values are low and indicate that multicollinearity is not a problem in this multiple regression
model. Clan control is again the most significant positive indicator of open source group effectiveness in terms
of group cohesion, with a beta coefficient of 0.321 with a T value 8.588 which is statistically significant at 0.01
level. The personal goals dimension of self control is also positive indicator of open source group effectiveness
in terms of group cohesion with a beta coefficient of 0.101 with a T value 2.699 which is statistically significant
at the 0.01 level. The other informal control factor autonomy dimension of self control is not a significant
indicator of open source group effectiveness in terms of group cohesion.
Table 10 Multiple Regression Model 3 Summary
Adjusted R
Std. Error of
R
R Square
Square
the Estimate
Durbin-Watson
.488(a)
.238
.234
.86470626
1.880
a Predictors: (Constant), Autonomy, Personal Goals, Clan Control b Dependent Variable: Benefits to Group members

Table 11 ANOVA(b)
Sum of
Squares
Df
Mean Square
F
Sig.
Regression 147.191
3
49.064
65.618
.000(a)
Residual
471.809
631
.748
Total
619.000
634
a Predictors: (Constant), Autonomy, Personal Goals, Clan Control b Dependent Variable: Benefits to Group Members

Table 12 Coefficients(a)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
B
Std. Error
3.427E-16
.034
.256
.035
.103
.035
.401
.035
b Dependent Variable: Benefits to Group Members
(Constant)
Clan Control
Personal Goals
Autonomy

Standardized
Coefficients

T Value

Sig.

.000
7.390
2.965
11.552

1.000
.000
.003
.000

Beta
.257
.103
.401

Collinearity Statistics
Tolerance

VIF

1.000
1.000
1.000

1.000
1.000
1.000

Tables 10, 11 and 12 show the results of the multiple regression analysis for the dependent variable benefits to
group members. Overall three independent variables explain 23.4 percent of the variance in the dependent
variable benefits to group members which is highly significant given the F value of 65.618 in the Anvoa table.
The tolerance and variance inflation factor values are low and indicate that multicollinearity is not a problem in
this multiple regression model. Clan control is again a significant positive indicator of open source group
effectiveness in terms of benefits to group members with a beta coefficient of 0.257 and a T value 7.390 which is
statistically significant at 0.01 level. The personal goals dimension of self control is a positive indicator of open
source group effectiveness in terms of benefits to group members with a beta coefficient of 0103 and T value
2.965 which is statistically significant at 0.01 level.. The autonomy dimension of self control is the strongest
positive indicator of open source group effectiveness in terms of benefits to group members with a beta
coefficient of 0.401 and a T value 11.552 which is statistically significant at 0.01 level.
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DISCUSSION OF DATA ANALYSIS RESULTS
Table 13 Summary of the results of hypotheses testing
Hypotheses (***) indicates 0.01 significant level

Supported/not supported

Clan control positively influences group effectiveness
H1a: Clan control positively influences project output.

Supported (***)

H1b: Clan control positively influences the group cohesion.

Supported (***)

H1c: Clan control positively influences the benefits to group members.
Self control positively influences group effectiveness
(Self control was split into two dimensions personal goals and autonomy)

Supported (***)

H2a: Personal goals positively influences project output.

Not supported

H2b: Personal goals positively influences group cohesion.

Supported (***)

H2c: Personal goals positively influences benefits to group members

Supported (***)

H3a: Autonomy positively influences project output

Not supported

H3b: Autonomy positively influences group cohesion

Not supported

H3c: Autonomy positively influences the benefits to group members.

Supported (***)

Of the nine hypotheses tested in three sets of multiple regression models, six hypotheses were supported at the
99 percent significant level. Clan control, as suggested by the existing literature, plays a prominent role in
maintaining control over the core developers in open source projects and would appear to positively influence
project output and cohesion of the core developers and the benefits they obtain. The output of an open source
project evolves over time depending on what each core developer group member chooses to work on (Osterloh,
Rota & Kuster 2002). Thus, clan control ensures that despite individual differences, the core developers of an
open source project share something in common – the shared goals and ideology of the open source project
(Kirsch 1996).
When the core developers participate in open source development approved activities such writing and sharing
code, sharing knowledge, and providing help and support to others programmers they are both intrinsically and
extrinsically rewarded by the clan (Ouchi 1979;Kirsch 1996). The intrinsic rewards are in the form of personal
benefits to group members. In the core developer groups of open source projects this ideology includes the
norms, values and beliefs of the hacker culture. Therefore if members identify strongly with the shared ideology
of the group, then the level of group cohesion increases (Ouchi 1979; Kirsch 1996). Furthermore, when clan
control is operating, members are rewarded for their commitment towards the clan, which in turn strengthens
group cohesion.
Self control through the personal goals of core developers also plays a prominent role in maintaining over the
core developers and would appear to positively influence the cohesion and benefits obtained by the group of core
developers in open source projects. Thus, it is the member’s responsibility to self-monitor, self-reward, and selfsanction their activities to achieve their personal goals (Kirsch 1997). Achieving personal goals through self
control can lead to feelings of accomplishment, personal growth and development, and increased self-esteem
(Lawler & Hall 1970).
Self control through autonomy does not appear to play a major role in maintaining control over the core
developers in open source projects, but does appear to positively influence benefits obtained by the group of core
developers. One of the strongest attractions to open source development is the freedom to choose what work one
does, and how they go about doing this work (Osterloh, Rota & Kuster 2002). This finding supports the view of
Markus, Manville and Agres (2000) who believe that intrinsic motivation and self-management of autonomous
knowledge workers plays a pivotal role in the success of open source projects. Personal goals and autonomy do
not appear to positively influence project output. Personal goals and autonomyt appear more likely to directly
benefit individual core developers and increase the cohesion within the group of core developers, resulting in
positive indirect benefits for open source projects.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The results of the multiple regression analysis reported in this paper show that clan control plays a significant
part in informally controlling the behaviour and outcomes of the core group of software developers in open
source projects by having a positive influence on the project output, group cohesion and benefits obtained by the
members of the core group of software developers. The two sub dimensions of self control—personal goals and
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autonomy—also play a significant part in informally controlling the behaviour and outcomes of the core group
of software developers in open source projects by having a positive influence on the group cohesion and benefits
obtained by the members of the core group of software developers. Overall, clan control appears to be the
dominant factor in exerting informal control over the core group of software developers in open source projects.
Furthermore, autonomy appears to be the most significant dimension of the self control factor for the core group
of software developers through the benefits which can be gained individually and by maintaining the cohesion of
the core group of developers for an open source project.
Overall, the findings of this study have important implications for the management of personnel in software
projects. The success of open source projects emphasise the importance of a collective and constructive mindset
in groups of developers and the need to also motivate developers at the individual level by allowing them to
pursue personal goals and maintain a certain level of autonomy in their work.
The findings of this study are based on the analysis of a very large quantitative data sample. Therefore, we
believe that our findings regarding the three factor model of informal control and its impact on the group
effectiveness of open source projects are relatively robust, valid and reliable. Open source software is
increasingly seen as a viable and effective way to develop software. Gaining a better understanding of the
dynamics of such an approach through better understanding how control is exerted over the core group of
software developers in such an open, fluid and virtual development environment has many important lessons for
the software industry and indeed for industry in general.
However, we do believe this study was the first serious attempt to quantify the measurement of informal control
and group effectiveness of the core group of software developers in open source projects and that further work is
required to improve and establish the validity and reliability of these constructs. A qualitative study of these
constructs would help to clarify and validate the dimensions of these constructs and identify other dimensions
which should be included in the measurement of informal control and group effectiveness for virtual groups of
software developers in open source projects.
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